


## EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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*Per our conversation*
  
 Executive Secretary

6/6/83

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June 6, 1983

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## MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Donald P. Gregg  
Assistant to the Vice President for  
National Security AffairsMs. Jacqueline Tillman  
Executive Assistant to the  
United States  
Representative to the United  
NationsMr. Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary  
Department of StateColonel George A. Joulwan  
Executive Assistant to the  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of  
Staff  
The PentagonLieutenant Colonel W. Richard Higgins  
Assistant for Interagency Matters  
Office of the Secretary of DefenseDr. Alton Keel  
Associate Director for National Security  
and International Affairs  
Office of Management and BudgetMr. Joseph Presel  
Executive Assistant  
Arms Control and Disarmament  
AgencyMr. Thomas B. Cormack  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence AgencyAmbassador Edward Rowny  
Chief Negotiator  
Arms Control and Disarmament  
Agency

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on START -- Tuesday, June 7, 1983 (S)

On June 3rd the papers supporting the NSC meeting on START scheduled for Tuesday, June 7th at 9:30 a.m. in the White House Cabinet room, were circulated. Attached (Tab A) is a revised version of one of these papers, the paper entitled START Issues for Decision. The only change is a brief reference (on Page 7) to the phasing issue. The second paper distributed on June 3rd, a paper entitled Approach to Handling Build-down, remains unchanged. (S)

Also attached (Tab B) is an interagency approved draft START Treaty Text. The draft text will be modified on the basis of the decisions made at the NSC meeting. The draft text itself will not be discussed at the meeting but it is provided for the information of those principals attending the meeting. (S)

*Robert M. Kimmitt* C-134  
Robert M. Kimmitt DEPUTY  
Executive Secretary

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Attachments

Tab A      Revised START Issues for Decision (S)  
Tab B      Draft START Treaty Text (S)

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CIA

Tab A

May 28, 1983

START ISSUES FOR DECISIONBackground

The START negotiations resume on June 8. During the last round, the US presented proposals for limiting heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), tabled a draft treaty on confidence-building measures (CBMs) and a document outlining the US "Basic Elements" of a START agreement. The basic framework of the US position remained as it had been presented in the summer of 1982.

The Soviets contended that US proposals would "emasculate" the Soviet ICBM force while permitting US modernization programs to proceed. They stated that the US proposal was not an acceptable basis for negotiation. They also rejected the idea of a separate agreement on confidence-building measures (CBMs). They tabled a draft treaty based largely on SALT II, but with a 28 percent reduction in strategic delivery vehicles from the Soviet level at the time SALT II was signed, about 2500, to 1800. They say they are prepared to accept significant cuts in warheads but only in the context of combining ballistic missile warheads and bomber weapons in a single category. In short, the Soviets demonstrated no inclination to move the talks forward.

The US Delegation's view is that the Soviets apparently regard our present START proposal, particularly those aspects dealing with ICBM force restructuring, as unacceptable. They argue that our proposal is designed not to promote stability and equality, but to obtain strategic advantages for the US. We would expect the Soviets to continue dismissing our proposal in its present form.

The recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission have stimulated considerable interest, both in the Congress and within the Administration, in reassessing our START position. Key members of Congress have made their support for MX contingent on modifications to our START proposal, and the President wrote to several Congressmen that we are now considering modifications to reflect the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations.

State, ACDA and the START negotiator believe that we should now alter our START proposal--not only to reflect the Scowcroft Commission's recommendation for a modified approach and to respond to Congressional pressures, but also to improve prospects for productive negotiations. Moreover, there is agreement (except for JCS) that we move away from the ceiling of 850 deployed missiles.

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Some believe we need to make changes now to our position that will bring us close to our final position. Others believe that our position now should retain considerable room for further bargaining.

Issues

There are two principal issues. One is the extent to which we seek to reduce Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight--that is, should we seek (a) the level that is our goal for the second phase of the negotiations (1.9 million kilograms), or (b) the level that would result from our current proposal for the first phase (2.5 million kilograms), or (c) a higher level? The other issue is whether throw-weight should be constrained directly, or indirectly through collateral constraints. Our current position calls for indirect limits on throw-weight (i.e., sub-ceilings on heavy and medium ICBMs) in Phase I and direct limits (i.e., an aggregate ballistic missile throw-weight ceiling) in Phase II. Our current Phase I proposal was designed to achieve a goal of reduction in Soviet throw-weight of 55 percent below the estimated current Soviet total of about 5.6 million kilograms.

One approach would seek a direct limit on throw-weight. The collateral constraints and the limit on deployed ballistic missiles would be dropped (leaving ballistic missile warheads and throw-weight as our two units of account). We would propose a direct throw-weight level (2.0 - 2.5 million kilograms) aimed at obtaining the large-scale reduction in Soviet throw-weight that our current proposal is designed to achieve.

An alternative approach would achieve throw-weight reductions indirectly as a consequence of reductions in deployed ballistic missiles and warheads, and other collateral constraints (leaving deployed ballistic missiles and their warheads as the two units of account). Our current proposed limits on heavy and medium ICBMs could be replaced by other collateral constraints. Under this approach, Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight would likely be about 3.0 million kilograms, about 46 percent below the estimated current Soviet total of about 5.6 million kilograms.

\*This figure represents an estimate of a likely force the Soviets could field under this approach. Soviet throw-weight could be higher (up to 3.4 million kilograms) if the Soviets choose to emphasize throw-weight to the detriment of other features of their strategic forces. The Intelligence Community believes that they are likely not to do so.

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The following sections discuss the main questions involved in modifying the US START position: whether to retain the 850 limit on deployed missiles, raise it, or drop it; what level we should propose for throw-weight limits; and whether to limit throw-weight directly or indirectly. Following that discussion are packages supported by various Agencies for a modified START position, accompanied by arguments for each package.

Finally, as an alternative to those packages, we could consider modifying the current position to the minimum extent necessary to reflect the recommendations of the Scowcroft report. This would require, at a minimum, a decision now on whether to retain the 850 limit on deployed ballistic missiles, raise it, or drop it altogether. State, ACDA and the START negotiator recommend more basic changes to our position for substantive, political, and negotiating reasons.

I. Should we retain the limit on deployed ballistic missiles, raise it, or drop it?

The report of the Scowcroft Commission states that arms control agreements should encourage deployment of small, single-warhead ICBMs. "This requires that arms control limitations and reductions be couched, not in terms of launchers, but in terms of equal levels of warheads of roughly equivalent yield. Such an approach could permit relatively simple agreements, using appropriate counting rules, that exert pressure to reduce the overall number and destructive power of nuclear weapons and at the same time give each side an incentive to move toward more stable and less vulnerable deployments."

The report states that the 850 limit on deployed ballistic missiles "should be reassessed since it is not compatible with a desirable evolution toward small, single warhead ICBMs". The report does not make any recommendation whether or not to drop deployed missiles as a unit of account.

1. Retain the 850 ceiling

The number of small ICBMs the United States might want to deploy would depend on the deployment mode chosen, cost, survivability, Congressional support, and the constraints on the number of Soviet warheads, and is, therefore, difficult to predict. Retention of the 850 limit would limit us to a deployment of no more than about 300 small, single warhead ICBMs

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in addition to 100 Peacekeeper ICBMs and planned SLBMs. This would appear inconsistent with the Commission's recommendation to promote a long-term evolution away from large highly fractionated ICBMs.

The JCS believes that it is not clear at this point whether the US need for small ICBMs will require an increase in the 850 deployed ballistic missile ceiling. Some believe that retaining the 850 limit may give us all the force structuring flexibility we need during the next decade since, in the context of US deployment of 100 MX under a ceiling of 5000 missile warheads, we are unlikely to deploy significantly more than 850 ballistic missiles. The Soviets, on the other hand, with a modern, single RV missile beginning flight testing are better placed over the next decade than we are to exploit the possibilities of large numbers of single RV ICBMs, which would increase their advantage in force survivability. The US could also pay a political price if the 850 limit is dropped since substantial reductions in deployed ballistic missiles are a prominent, popular, and readily understandable element of the US position. Finally, in view of Soviet stalling in Geneva, some would argue that the appropriate US negotiating response is to hold to our current position and not make modifications which could be considered movement toward the Soviet position.

## 2. Raise the ceiling on deployed missiles

Under this approach the United States would retain a limit on deployed ballistic missiles but raise it to provide more headroom for large numbers of small missiles. The ceiling could be: between 1050 and 1250; 1450 (which corresponds roughly to the number of deployed missiles the United States would have under the Soviet proposal); or 1600 (the current number of US deployed ballistic missiles). The representative limits cited above could permit from 500 to more than 1100 small missiles, depending on the limit chosen, the number of Peacekeeper ICBMs deployed, and the size of the US SLBM force.

Raising the limit would respond to the Scowcroft Commission's report by making room in our START proposal for the evolution to small, single warhead ICBMs. A level could be chosen with sufficient "headroom" to give us considerable force structuring flexibility in the future. At the same time, retaining a ceiling on missiles would avoid the potential political liability of appearing to abandon constraints in a category of strategic capability (i.e., missiles) that has

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previously been subject to constraints and that some still consider significant. It would also have the negotiating advantage of moving us closer to the Soviet proposal of 1800 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

One disadvantage of raising the limit is that this may appear contrary to our objective of deep reductions. In addition, the Scowcroft Commission report argued against reductions in the number of deployed missiles, and cited the negative aspects of relying on such limits in past agreements.

### 3. Drop limits on deployed missiles

Under this approach the United States would have flexibility to deploy a larger number of small ICBMs within the constraints on warhead numbers and destructive potential.

This approach would encourage an evolution in both the US and the USSR to smaller missiles and would provide substantial flexibility to exploit the advantages of small missiles to enhance survivability and stability. The START agreement would focus primarily on broad measures of capability (warheads and throw-weight). The Scowcroft Commission report makes clear the drawbacks of use of launcher limits in past agreements--i.e., agreements that rely primarily on launcher limits create incentives for large, highly fractionated missiles. Some believe this option corresponds most closely to the approach advocated in the Scowcroft Commission's report as more likely to be practical, stabilizing, and lasting than constraints on force structures. They believe that dropping limits on deployed missiles could be useful in obtaining Congressional support for the development, production and deployment of the Peacekeeper and a small ICBM.

Dropping the limits on deployed missiles would emphasize the limits on warheads and destructive potential, but could lead to increased pressure to limit bomber weapons, which would not be in the US interest. In addition, if the Soviets deploy a large number of missiles and missile launchers, this could provide a potential to deploy additional warheads.

## II. What throw-weight level should we seek?

Our current proposal seeks to substantially reduce Soviet missile throw-weight in phase I indirectly to about 2.5 million

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kilograms through the limit of 5000 missile warheads, the sub-ceiling of 2500 ICBM warheads and a limit of 210 medium and heavy ICBMs of which no more than 110 could be heavy ICBMs. In Phase II Soviet missile throw-weight would be further reduced to a direct ceiling of 1.9 million kilograms. Since the US throw-weight level is currently at 1.9 million kilograms, and the Soviet level is at about 5.6 million kilograms, any throw-weight level which exceeds the US current level would require the Soviets to reduce unilaterally.

There are three options:

(1) A level of 2.0 million kilograms (64 percent below the estimated current Soviet level but above the US level) would be consistent with our proposal for the second phase. We could argue that we were accelerating achievement of what has always been our ultimate goal. A proposal for a low ceiling now could give us bargaining room.

(2) A ceiling of 2.5 million kilograms (55 percent below the estimated current Soviet level) would be roughly equivalent to our current proposal for the first phase, and would allow both sides somewhat greater flexibility to structure forces. It is the level the US has proposed in conjunction with the ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile warheads.

(3) Constraints that could result in about 3.0 million kilograms (46 percent below the estimated current Soviet level) would permit the Soviets greater force structure flexibility than the other options, and hence such a throw-weight level could be more likely to lead to an agreement.

The illustrative force tables for the options describe representative Soviet forces for each of these levels. While all the options limit the Soviets to 5000 warheads, the higher the throw-weight, the larger could be the size and explosive power of Soviet warheads, and the greater could be the Soviet potential to deploy additional warheads.

### III. Should we seek direct or indirect limits on throw-weight?

The Scowcroft Commission report does not explicitly address this question. It does state that simple aggregate limits "are likely to be more practical, stabilizing, and lasting than elaborate, detailed limitations on force structure and modernization." Constraints on large missiles, however, would not be inconsistent with the Commission's emphasis on small missiles.

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The principal advantage of a direct throw-weight limit is that it would give each side more flexibility to structure its forces within the limit. It would directly constrain the overall potential of each side's missile forces, without dictating a particular force structure. This would undercut the Soviet complaint that our indirect throw-weight limits through medium and heavy ICBM constraints would require them to rebuild according to "US standards". Some believe that combining warhead and throw-weight ceilings would be the most straightforward way to constrain the sides to equal numbers of warheads of roughly equivalent yield. A direct limit would preclude growth in Soviet throw-weight that an indirect limit might permit if the Soviets chose to maximize throw-weight within the constraints. The Intelligence Community believes that the Soviets are likely not to maximize throw-weight to the detriment of other features of their strategic forces.

Some believe the principal drawback to a direct limit on throw-weight is that (depending on the level) it would undercut chances for an agreement, and as an initial objective could be perceived as a hardening of our position and a step away from achieving an agreement. Moreover, they believe the Soviets are less likely to accept throw-weight as a unit of account for START than collateral constraints. Some believe the level of throw-weight is not as significant a measure of military potential as warheads, and should not be assigned the same priority in our START proposal. Additionally, some believe that direct limits on throw-weight cannot be adequately verified. Others point out that indirect limits also require verification of the throw-weight of Soviet missiles.

IV. Other Issues

1. Phasing. The current US proposal would reduce Soviet throw-weight indirectly in Phase I, and would place a lower direct ceiling on throw-weight in Phase II. The packages proposed by State, ACDA, and the START Negotiator would combine the current two-phased approach into a single phase.\*

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\* OSD position to be provided.

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2. Air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM). Our current position is to accept in Phase II a ceiling of 28 on the average number of ALCMs on heavy bombers, with a limit of 20 on the number of ALCMs on existing types of heavy bombers. One of the packages presented below recommends proposing a maximum limit of 20 for all heavy bombers (not just existing types) on the basis that (1) there are no projected US requirements for a bomber to carry more than 20 ALCMs, and (2) to counter the Soviet criticism that our present position would permit 11,000 ALCMs, a level we do not require. The other packages retain our existing position on ALCMs.

3. Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM). Our current position does not contain limits on SLCMs. The current guidance to the Delegation instructs the Delegation to respond to any Soviet proposals to limit SLCMs by soliciting Soviet views on how such limits could be verified. Two of the packages presented below refer to limits on the number of SLCM platforms; the others do not address SLCMs.

4. Modernization constraints. Our current position contains a number of modernization constraints: limits on ICBM and SLBM fractionation, limits on the weight of re-entry vehicles on new types of missiles, and a ban on new heavy missiles. Our current proposal does not include limits on the number of new types of missiles. One of the packages proposes banning new types of heavy and medium ICBMs and restricting new types of light ICBMs to a single warhead during the first ten years of START. (The Peacekeeper and the SS-X-24 ICBMs would be permitted as existing types.) Other packages do not require limits on the number of new types of missiles.

5. Draft treaty. At the end of the last round, all Washington Agencies agreed in an instruction cable to the US START Delegation that we should be in a position to table a draft treaty early in Round IV. The Soviets, for their part, tabled a draft treaty during Round III and, in the inter-round period, they have sought to make propaganda mileage by false charges that the US refused to discuss treaty language with them. In order to deprive the Soviets of this propaganda advantage and to further the negotiations by putting the US position on the table in a unified fashion, the US Delegation believes it should be

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authorized to table a draft treaty early in Round IV. The START Delegation will incorporate changes to the US position arising from NSC decisions into the current draft text. The Delegation will send this revised draft back to Washington for prompt consideration by the US Government.

V. Packages

The following packages would: (a) retain our goal of a ceiling of 5000 ballistic missile warheads, (b) make no change in our proposal to limit heavy bombers, and (c) combine the phases of our current proposal. In addition, none of the packages would retain the current proposal's sub-limit of 2500 ICBM warheads or the Phase II ban on all heavy missiles.

The packages differ in: (a) the throw-weight level they seek; (b) the way throw-weight is constrained; (c) whether the number of deployed missiles is limited; (d) the limits on ALCMs; and, (e) whether to seek platform limits on SLCMs.

OSD and JCS will provide packages at a later date.

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LIMITS	CURRENT POSITION	REVISED POSITION				
		STATE	OSD	ACDA	START NEGOTIATOR	JCS
Missile Warheads	5000	5000	TO BE PROVIDED	5000		
Heavy Bombers	350	350		350		
Deployed Missiles	850	1150		No limit		TO BE PROVIDED
Throw-weight	Phase I: 110/210 limit on heavy and medium ICBMs. 2.5 million kg of Soviet throw-weight as a goal  Phase II: Direct limit of 1.9 million kg of throw-weight	150 heavy ICBMs. Results in about 3.0* million kg of Soviet throw-weight		Direct limit of 2.5 million kg		
ALCMs	Average of 28 per heavy bomber/20 per existing heavy bomber	20 per heavy bomber		Average of 28 per heavy bomber/20 per existing heavy bomber		
SLCMs	No limit	Platform limit		No limit	Platform limit	
New Types	Ban new types of heavy ICBMs	Ban new types of heavy/medium ICBMs & limit light ICBMs to single RVs		No limit		

\*This figure represents an estimate of a likely force the Soviets could field under this approach. Soviet throw-weight could be higher (up to 3.0 million kg) to the detriment of

TAB  
B

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
ON THE REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating con-  
sequences for all mankind,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the  
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recognizing that the interests of the Parties and the  
interests of international security require the strengthening of  
strategic stability,

Convinced that the measures for the reduction of strategic  
offensive arms provided for in this Treaty will reduce the risk  
of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and  
security,

Have agreed as follows:



Article I

Each Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, reduce and limit strategic offensive arms and adopt the other measures provided for in this Treaty.

Article II

1. Beginning on the date of entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall reduce or otherwise limit its strategic offensive arms so that [eight] years after that date, and thereafter:

(a) the aggregate number of warheads on its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs does not exceed 5,000;

(b) the number of warheads on its deployed ICBMs does not exceed 2,500;

(c) the aggregate number of its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs does not exceed 850;

(d) the aggregate number of its deployed heavy and medium ICBMs does not exceed 210;

(e) the number of its deployed heavy ICBMs does not exceed 110; and

(f) the number of its heavy bombers does not exceed 400.

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2. Beginning on the date of entry into force of this Treaty, and thereafter, each Party shall reduce or otherwise limit the aggregate number of its ICBMs, SLBMs and ASBMs, that are not deployed, to \_\_\_\_ percent of the allowed aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and ASBMs.

3. The above reductions and limitations shall be completed in accordance with the Schedule of Reductions set forth in Annex II.

[Article III]\*

[1. Beginning on \_\_\_\_\_, each Party shall reduce or otherwise limit its strategic offensive arms so that \_\_\_\_ years after that date, and thereafter:

- (a) all of its heavy ICBMs shall have been destroyed;
- (b) the aggregate throw-weight of its deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs does not exceed \_\_\_\_ kilograms; and
- (c) the number of its air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) deployed on its heavy bombers does not exceed the product of \_\_\_\_ and the number of its heavy bombers, and the number of ALCMs deployed on any heavy bomber of an existing type does not exceed \_\_\_\_.

2. The above reductions and limitations shall be completed in accordance with the Schedule of Reductions set forth in Annex II.]

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\* Bracketed pending decision on modification of U.S. position.

Article IV

1. Neither Party shall have under construction at any time strategic offensive arms subject to the provisions of this Treaty in excess of numbers consistent with a normal construction schedule, as specified in Annex I of this Treaty.

2. Neither Party shall:

(a) convert land-based ballistic missiles that are not ICBMs into ICBMs, nor test them for this purpose;

(b) convert land-based launchers of ballistic missiles that are not ICBMs into launchers for launching ICBMs, nor test them for this purpose;

(c) develop, produce, flight-test, or deploy ICBMs that can be launched by land-based launchers other than ICBM launchers; nor

(d) develop, produce, test, or deploy land-based launchers of ballistic missiles that are not ICBMs that also have the capability of launching ICBMs permitted by this Treaty.

3. Neither Party shall develop, produce, test, or deploy:

(a) ballistic missiles capable of a range in excess of \_\_\_\_\_ kilometers for installation on waterborne vehicles other than submarines, or launchers of such missiles including free floating canister launchers. This Treaty shall

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not require changes in current ballistic missile transport practices;

(b) fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement on the ocean floor, on the seabed, or on the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or in the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles, which move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers. This obligation shall apply to all areas of the ocean floor and the seabed, including the seabed zone referred to in Articles I and II of the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; or

(c) systems for placing into Earth orbit, including fractional orbit, nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction.

4. Neither Party shall flight-test or deploy:

(a) ICBMs or ASBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than 10;

(b) SLBMs with a number of reentry vehicles greater than 14;

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(c) ICBMs, SLBMs, or ASBMs, of types that were not deployed as of \_\_\_\_\*, with multiple reentry vehicles or with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, the weight of any one of which exceeds 225 kilograms, nor

(d) ICBMs, SLBMs, or ASBMs, of types that were not deployed as of \_\_\_\_\_\*, with a single reentry vehicle, the weight of which exceeds \_\_\_\_\_ kilograms.

5. Neither Party shall develop, produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy SLBMs, heavy ASBMs, or heavy ICBMs of types that were not deployed as of the date of signature of this Treaty, nor produce or deploy additional such missiles of types that were deployed as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

#### Article V

1. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modification, modernization, and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

2. Within the limitations provided for in Articles II and III of this Treaty and subject to the provisions of this Treaty, each Party has the right to determine the composition of its forces.

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\*A date earlier than the date of signature of this Treaty.

Article VI

1. Each Party shall limit the number of its test and training launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs to a number not to exceed \_\_\_\_, all of which shall be located at test ranges designated in the Memorandum of Understanding.

2. ICBM and SLBM launchers at test ranges shall be constructed, converted, or used only for the purpose of testing and training, and not for deployment.

3. Each Party shall limit the number of ICBMs and SLBMs at test ranges of ICBMs and SLBMs to a number not to exceed \_\_\_\_ . Such missiles shall be included in the limit specified in paragraph 2 of Article II.

Article VII

1. ICBMs, SLBMs, ASBMs, and heavy bombers in excess of the limits provided in this Treaty shall be destroyed in accordance with the procedures specified in Annex IV, and shall remain subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they are so destroyed, or otherwise cease to be subject to these limitations under the agreed procedures.

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2. The Parties may store \_\_\_\_ ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs for use as space launch vehicles at designated space support centers, in accordance with the agreed measures set forth in Annex IV of this Treaty. Such missiles shall not be included in the limit specified in paragraph 2 of Article II.

### Article VIII

1. Neither Party shall:

(a) develop, test, produce, or deploy systems for rapid reload of ICBM launchers;

(b) provide hardened storage facilities at ICBM launcher deployment areas;

(c) store more than two ICBMs at any ICBM launcher deployment area; or

(d) provide ground-support equipment at any ICBM launcher deployment area in excess of that required for normal deployment and maintenance.

2. Except as provided for in paragraph 2 of Article VII and in subparagraph 1 (c) of this Article, each Party shall store all of its ICBMs, SLBMs, and ASBMs, that are not deployed,

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at designated storage facilities. Storage facilities for ICBMs that are not deployed shall be located no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM launcher deployment area.

3. Neither Party shall conduct training activities or exercises involving the rapid reload or simulated rapid reload of ICBM launchers, nor conduct any other activities or exercises that involve in any other manner rapid reload of any ICBM launcher after it has launched an ICBM.

#### Article IX

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall implement agreed measures as provided for in Annex IV; in addition, each Party may use national technical means of verification at its disposal, in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Neither Party shall interfere with agreed measures undertaken in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article or with national technical means of verification.

3. Neither Party shall impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by agreed measures undertaken in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article or by national technical means. In this connection, the obligation not to impede includes the obligation not to use concealment measures associated with testing, including those measures aimed at



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concealing the association between ICBMs and launchers during testing.

4. The encryption of telemetry on systems subject to the provisions of this Treaty is prohibited.

5. On board engineering test measurements shall be made, and all such measurements shall be broadcast using unencrypted telemetry, during each test flight or training flight of an ICBM, SLBM or ASBM.

#### Article X

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission, under regulations governing procedures to be agreed between the Parties.

2. The Parties agree that, within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, with respect to this Treaty, they shall:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide such information as is necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

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(c) at least twice annually notify each other of the replacement dismantling, destruction, and conversion of strategic offensive arms performed in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(d) agree upon further measures contributing to the effectiveness of the verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.

3. At least twice annually in the Standing Consultative Commission the Parties shall maintain and update by category the Agreed Data Base established by the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Data-Base on the Strategic Offensive Arms of (date of signature of The Treaty).

#### Article XI

1. This Treaty shall be of (\_\_\_\_) duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

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Article XII

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

Article XIII

1. This Treaty, and its Annexes which form an integral part hereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.